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Evolution of mammalian social structure 
Ronald K CHESSER*, Derrick W. SUGG, 0. Eugene RHODES, Jr, 
James M. NOVAK and Michael H. SMITH* 
Chesser R. K., Sugg D. W., Rhodes 0. E., Jr, Novak J. M. and Smith M. H. Evolution 
of mammalian social structure. [In: Ecological genetics in mammals. G. B. Hartl and 
J. Markowski, eds]. Acta theriol. 38, Suppl. 2: 163 - 17 4. 
Social groups may be viewed as collections of individuals exhibiting nonindepend-
ent behavior and organized in a cooperative manner. The evolutionary advantage of 
social behavior to individuals must be measured in its relativity to other potential 
behaviors, the scale of competitive interactions, and under a variety of environmental 
and genetic constraints. A primary tenet of social evolution is that coancestry will 
promote the genes of related individuals. High values of coancestry, however, do not 
necessarily translate into evolutionary advantage unless the primary competitive 
interactions occur among the groups. Coancestry is affected by the breeding tactics 
within and rates of genetic exchange among social groups. Low rates of exchange 
among groups, regardless of breeding tactics, may result in high values for intragroup 
coancestry but may lead to inbreeding depression in progeny. Likewise, breeding 
tactics such as polygyny, may not impart any long-lasting evolutionary advantage if 
genetic exchange rates are high. The evolution of social organizations typified by 
different breeding and migration strategies is evaluated to determine the conditions 
necessary for various tactics to result in genetic contributions by individuals equal to 
those of monogamous mating systems. The models show that breeding and dispersal 
tactics have probably evolved in concert and predict that social groups which are 
characterized by strong gene correlations are likely to exhibit relatively low group 
advantage for progeny survival and breeding. There is little impetus for high gene 
correlations to accrue in situations where group advantage is very high relative to 
monogamous systems. 
Savannah River Ecology Laboratory, P. 0. Drawer E, Aiken, South Carolina 29802, 
USA 
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Introduction 
The concepts of inclusive fitness and altruism (Hamilton 1963, 1964a, b) have 
lead evolutionary biologists to explore the genetic. consequences of social or-
ganization. Recently, studies have centered on the ultimate costs or benefits of 
dispersal and breeding strategies as well as their effects on individual fitness 
(Bengtsson 1978, Greenwood 1980, Shields 1982, Waser and Jones 1983, Liberg 
and von Schantz 1986, Chesser and Ryman 1986, Clutton-Brock 1989). Breeding 
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and dispersal tactics are primary factors governing the accumulation of gene corre-
lations within, and hence, the partitioning of genetic variance among groups 
(Chesser 1991a, b). Tactics such as polygyny and sex-biased dispersal may alter 
genotypic distributions from those expected for panmixia and thereby set the stage 
for modifying behavioral interactions within and among groups. 
Social behavior is defined by interactions among individuals and not by genetic 
relatedness (cf Wilson 1975). Gene correlations, however, may be viewed as 
precursors to the maintenance and evolution of social behaviors (Hamilton 1963, 
1964a, b, Chesser and Ryman 1986). Evidence of this association is found in the 
numerous empirical attempts to assess genetic relationships within socially struc-
tured populations (Selander 1970, Schwartz and Armitage 1980, Chesser 1983, 
Foltz and Hoogland 1983, McCullough and Chesser 1987, Melnick 1987). Most 
studies have considered dispersal, or the lack thereof, as the primary factor 
influencing coancestry (Cockerham 1969, 1973) within groups (Bengtsson 1978, 
Moore and Ali 1984, Chesser and Ryman 1986, Keane 1990). Hence, with a paucity 
of dispersal, inbreeding was seen as the major contributor to gene correlations 
within groups and much attention centered on the optimal dispersal rate relative 
to the cost of inbreeding (Bengtsson 1978, Chesser and Ryman 1986). 
Chesser (1991a, b) documented that considerable levels of gene correlations 
(coancestry; Cockerham 1969, 1973) could accrue from polygyny and female 
philopatry without invoking inbreeding. Coefficients of relationship within breed-
ing groups (lineages in Chesser 1991a, b) between 33 and 40 percent could be 
maintained even with random male dispersal. These results are particularly 
relevant to studies of mammalian social evolution because approximately 65 
percent of mammalian taxa exhibit some degree offemale philopatry and polygyny 
(Greenwood 1980). The high incidence of these breeding and dispersal tactics 
indicates that such behaviors may provide selective advantages compared to 
random admixtures of breeding individuals. However, species vary in the degree 
of philopatry and polygyny exhibited and many taxa have adopted different 
breeding and dispersal tactics (Greenwood 1980). 
If there are tactics by which species may achieve high genetic relationship 
within groups without substantial inbreeding costs, relative to other groups, then 
why have not all taxa evolved to optimize those characteristics? Obviously, there 
are additional constraints on the individuals and populations, other than genetic 
relationship, that govern the evolution of behaviors (Moore and Ali 1984). Natural 
selection acts on the phenotypic expression of the individual, not the breeding 
group or population. Some behaviors may not allow equitable genetic contributions 
of all individuals (such as polygyny). In this paper we develop models that 
determine the conditions necessary for the evolution of various breeding and 
dispersal behaviors that result in the same individual genetic contributions to 
progeny as those of monogamy and panmixia. These models do not preclude 
advantages bestowed on successful individuals, but rather that there is no selective 
advantage of panmictic mating because the expected genetic contribution by an 
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individual is the same. The methods employed for development of the models 
utilize similar parameters and variable definitions as those of Chesser (1991a, b). 
Gene correlations and parameter definitions 
We will investigate the influence of various breeding and dispersal tactics on 
the gene correlations defined as follows: F - average correlation of genes within 
individuals (inbreeding coefficient), 8mm - the average coancestry among progeny 
of the same sex within breeding groups, 8mf - the average coancestry among 
progeny of different sex within breeding groups, and 8 - average correlation of 
genes between random progeny within breeding groups. The parameters necessary 
to derive the appropriate variables are: 
n - number of breeding females within breeding groups for a given generation, 
s - number of breeding groups (social groups or subpopulations) within the 
population, 
dm and df' - dispersal rates for males and females, respectively, 
¢ - probability that random females within a breeding group mate with the same 
male. 
Chesser (1991a) defined the parameter <P as 
(1) ~= 
m 
"b2 -b. 
,L, t t 
i = 1 
-----
n (n - 1) 
where mis the number of breeding males per breeding group, and bi is the number 
of females mated by the ith male. However, because 
m 
(2) 
i = 1 
with (\2 denoting the variance in numbers of females mated by males, the expres-
sion for <P becomes 
(3) m rai + b (b - 1)] ~ = -~n~(n - 1) 
The expressions above involve several assumptions including steady-state 
population size, equal size of all breeding groups, and discrete, non-overlapping 
generations. 
Dispersal and breeding tactics 
Chesser (1991a, b) concluded that dispersal and breeding tactics probably 
coevolved. The impetus for particular breeding and dispersal tactics is to increase 
the coancestry 11mong individuals within brPeding groups relative to the coancestry 
among individuals from different breeding groups. Hence, altruistic behavior dis-
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played among individuals within groups enhances the transmittal of genes of group 
members. Chesser (1991b) used asymptotic values for inbreeding (F), coancestry 
among progeny of the same sex (8mml, and coancestry among progeny of different 
sex (8mf), to determine the variables necessary for comparison of the resultant 
gene correlations within breeding groups. Asymptotic values of inbreeding and 
coancestry are necessary and sufficient because gene correlations among groups 
(a in Chesser 199 la, b) represent genetic variation that is lost and is therefore 
unavailable for natural selection as long the groups maintain their integrity. Thus, 
the variables arc asymptotic relative to the amount of remaining genetic variation 
(Chesser 199lb) or to the most distantly related genes (Cockerham 1973). The 
asymptotic values were defined as 
(4) F= _ [1-(1-y)(dm+d[-dmdf)] [cj>(n-1)+2)] Sn - [Sn - ~ (n - 1) - 2] (1 - (1-y) (dm + dt - dm df)] 
(where y denotes 1/s) for the inbreeding coefficient, and 
(5) 
(6) 
/\ 
emm"" d l 4 + 2<jl + 2 (1- .Y) [ m (1 - ¢) + d[ 
/\ n-1/\ 1 
0 m[=-n-. - e mm+ 4n 
for coancestry among progeny of the same and different sex, respectively (expres-
sion 5 assumes that (n-1)/(ns-1) ~ 1/s, see Chesser 199lb). The average coancestry 
among progeny within breeding groups is 
(7) 
/\ /\ /\ 
~ = [8 mm + e mf] (1 - F) + F 
2 
Finally, the coefficient of relationship (Wright 1922) is 
(8) 
/\ 
28 
r=--
/\ 
l+F 
which, in this instance, provides a measure of the proportion of genes shared 
between random members of a breeding group. The value of r attains an equi-
librium value for a given breeding and dispersal regime as do the F-statistics 
(Chesser 199lb). Thus, the coefficient of relationship may be expressed as a 
differential rate function 
(9) 20 z (El -r L1 0) z L1 0 r=--=· ---=--1+.P 1+P+AP AF 
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Table 1. Expressions for determining the expected asymptotic values of inbreeding (F), coancestry 
within groups (Omrn - among same sex, 8rnf- among different sexes, 0 - mean value), and coefficient 
of relationship (r) within groups for random mating and polygynous mating. Expressions arc given for 
two different breeding and dispersal tactics. Definitions for parameters are provided in the text. 
Random mating Polygyny 
Female philopatry - male dispersal 
F=~~l_-_d~m~(_l-~y~)~~ 
4n - (4n -1)[1-dm(l -y)] 
1 
Bmm = 0, Bmr= 4n 
O= 2-dm(l-y) 
2 [dm (4n-4ny +y-)+ 1] 
dm (l-y)-2 
r =---~~~---
2dm (l -2n -y + 2ny)- 2 
F= y (n + 1) 
8n-y (7n-1) 
1 2n + 1 
Bmm =5, Bmm = Tz;:;--
8 = 4n + 2y + 1 - ny 
3 (8n- 7ny+y) 
r = 4n + 2y + - ny 
3(4n-3ny+y) 
Male philopatry - female dispersal 
F= 1-dr(l -y) 
4n - (4n -1)[1-dr(l-y)I 
1 Omm = 0, Bmt= 4n 
0=----,-..,....--2_-_d~;_(_l_-~y)~~-
2 [dr (4n - 4ny + y-1) + ll 
r= dt(l-y)-2 
2dr(l-2n-y + 2ny)-2 
F = _ y (n + 1) 
8n-y(7n-l) 
8mm=-- 1 -
6+2 (1-y) 
e - 2 (n + 1)-y 
mf- 4n(4-y) 
8 = (2 +y)(l + 2n -ny) 
(4 - y)(Bn - ?ny + y) 
r= (2+y)(2n+~ 
(4-y)(4n - 3ny +y) 
which will maintain a constant value until all genetic variation is lost (Li e and 
Li F become zero). 
The resultant inbreeding, coancestries, and coefficients of relationship for 
different breeding and dispersal scenarios arc presented in Table 1. Tactics of 
female ph11opatry and male dispersal are presented for both randomly mating 
(df = ¢ = O) and polygynous (df= O; dm =qi= 1) mating systems. Secondly, male 
philopatry with female dispersal is depicted for random mating (dm = ¢ = O) and 
polygyny (dm = O; df = cj> = 1). For each tactic, the rate of dispersal from the native 
area that would be necessary to result in the same genetic correlation within 
groups can be derived by setting the r for random mating equal to that for 
polygyny, and solving for the dispersal rate (Chesser 1991b). For male dispersal 
and female philopatry this solution is 
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(10) dm = 2 (Sn - 1) 
16n 2 + Bn - 2 - y - ny ( 4n - 1) 
If the number of breeding groups is large, then dm = lln (cf Chesser 1991b). 
This relatively low dispersal rate will yield an asymptotic inbreeding coefficient 
of almost 20%, which will equal the coancestry resultant from philopatry. For 
female biased dispersal and male philopatry the dispersal rate that would produce 
equal ultimate coancestry within groups is 
(11) d/ = _____ ~(12~ - 4ny + y -~ _____ _ 
16n (n + 1)- ny (12 - 5y + 4ny) + 2y - 4 -.v2 
which, if the number of groups is large, becomes 
(12) d __ 6n-1 _ f- 4n (n + 1) - 1 
Thus, the dispersal rate necessary to produce identical relationship within 
breeding groups for random mating and philopatry is greater when females are 
the dispersers rather than when males disperse (Fig. I). 
Evolution would not likely favor modification of dispersal rate to increase the 
gene correlations within breeding groups. Asymptotic inbreeding coefficients of 
approximately 20% will probably result in decreased viability or fertility (Falconer 
1981). Also, it is difficult to conceive how natural selection acting on individuals 
could maintain a dispersal rate of Iln. Similar levels of gene correlations within 
groups, however, can be achieved with female philopatry, polygyny, and random 
male dispersal (Chesser 1991a). These traits may be relatively invariant within 
a sex, and thus represent evolutionary tactics rather than population charac-
teristics such as rates. 
0.8 l 
07!~ 
41 06i (1j 
er: t'.l.51 
(ii 0.4! 
r.n 
oaj ... C1) 
c. l 
.!!? o.zi 
Q 01j 
o.o: 
4 9101112 
No. Females I Group 
Fig. 1. The dispersal rate, as a function of the number nf femal<'s pPr group, necessary to produce 
identical coefficients of rPlationship within breeding groups for random mating and philopatry for 
both males and female5. 
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Individual fitness and the evolution of social groups 
Tactics that result in high coancestry within breeding groups may not necessa-
rily infer an advantage to individuals. Similarly, homogeneity of gene frequencies 
within a population will not provide any advantage for altruistic behavior. 
Therefore, the formation of groups, which provides a means to partition gene 
frequencies within the population, provides an impetus for cooperative behavior. 
If social groups are to be the foci for cooperation and altruism, then there must 
be some advantage for individuals to be affiliated with the groups. In the following 
procedures we will develop the conditions necessary for the equivalence of fitnesses 
for individuals in either monogamous or polygamous mating systems in which 
groups may or may not be present. 
One major difference between monogamous and polygynous mating systems is 
that the probability of mating for polygynous males may be considerably lower 
than that for monogamy. For example, if there is but one breeding male for each 
group of n females, the probability that a male will breed is lln; with monogamy, 
however, the probability of a male mating may be near unity. With monogamy, 
the coancestry of a breeder to his progeny is 1/4 and is 1/8 to his sibling's progeny. 
Thus, in a monogamous mating system, the expected coancestry of an adult to 
progeny 18 
(13) CD CD 3CD flM=-+-=~· 4 8 8 
where w is the probability of survival of the progeny. In a monogamous mating 
system there is no expected coancestry to other individuals outside of the direct 
family. In polygynous mating systems, however, the genes of progeny produced 
by different females within groups are expected to be correlated (by fl). The value 
of e is dependent upon the value of ¢J (mean and variance of male mating success) 
and the number of females per breeding group as is shown in equation (5). Using 
p to reference the probability of a male mating and g as a scalar by which group 
membership increases or decreases the probability of progeny survival (probability 
of survival of progeny is gw ), the expected coancestry of an adult male to progeny 
born within a polygynous mating group is 
(14) fl =€ff PW+ gpw 0 + gw 0 = gw [p(l + 2 0) + 2 fl] 
p 4 2 2 4 
By setting 8M = 8p we can determine the conditions at which the expected 
gene contributions of a breeding male are equivalent regardless of the male 
breeding tactic. These boundary conditions are 
(15) 
or (16) 
fl= 3 - 2pg 
4g(l+p) 
3 
g = 2 [p (1 + 28 ) + 28] 
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For adult females the coancestry to the progeny is 
(17) 
which yield the same boundary conditions for coancestry (equation 14). However, 
the solution for group advantage is slightly different, giving 
(18) 3 g females = 2 + 48 (l + p) 
Equation 14 gives the coancestry within polygynous breeding groups that would 
be necessary for adults to have the same gene contributions as they would have 
if there was a monogamous mating system. A portion of the gene contributions 
may be provided by their relatives because not all of the males breed. Figure 2 
~ (ii 
QI 
u 
c: 
~ 0.188 
u 
0.000' 
o.oo 
1.00 5 
Fig. 2. Three-dimensional surface diagram depicting the boundary conditions for coanccstry within 
groups as a function of group advantage (g) and probability of mating (p) which yield the genetic 
equivalence of monogamy and polygynous rnaling systems for individual adults. 
41 10.00 
Cl 
~ 7.71 
~ 
"C 
<( 
g. 3.13 
0 
c'.3 
0.00 
100 0.20 
Fig. 3. 'I'hree-dimensional surfacte diagram depicting thl' boundary conditions for group advanbge (g) 
as a function of cuancestry within groups (6) and probability of mating (p) which yield the genetic 
equivalence of monog-ilmy nnd polygynous mating systems for individual adult males. 
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depicts the surface of this genetic equivalence wherein the effects of monogamy 
and polygyny are equal for individuals. Equations 15 and 17 give the group 
advantage scalar as a function of the co ancestry within groups and the probability 
of male mating (Fig. 3). Clearly, as the group advantage becomes large (g >> 1) 
small values of coancestry within breeding groups are necessary to convey equi-
valence to a monogamous breeding system. 
The variables for co ancestry (e) and probability of mating (p) are not necessarily 
independent. Without inbreeding, the highest possible coancestry within groups 
ranges from 0.167 (very large groups) to approximately 0.194 (small groups; Chesser 
199la) in completely polygynous systems exhibiting female philopatry. However, in 
such systems the probability of a particular male mating is 1/n. Thus, e"" 0.175 and 
p = 0.20 appear to be reasonable values for many polygynous mammals, values 
which require relatively low values for group advantage (g c= 2.4) to insure the same 
genetic contributions for adult males as monogamy. Without female philopatry, 
polygynous mating systems can produce coancestry values between 0.125 and 0.167 
depending on the size of the groups. Using p = 0.2 as above, the required value of 
group advantage would range between 2.5 and 3. However, because of the female 
dispersal the groups would necessarily be re-formed each generation. 
Discussion 
The above models were designed to explore boundary conditions for particular 
behaviors. As such, they provide the functional equivalence for different breeding-
and dispersal tactics in producing intragroup gene correlations and contributions 
of adult individuals to the subsequent generation whether they actually breed or 
not. The models define the conditions for which the tactics are equivalent in 
producing a result; thus, they represent the lower bounds of the evolutionary 
process. The values necessary to result in equality are therefore minimum values. 
Dispersal tactics for mammalian populations have received considerable at-
tention in ecology, evolution, sociobiology, and conservation biology. Although 
dispersal strategies vary among sex and age categories (Lidicker 1975, Lidicker 
and Caldwell 1982, Stenseth 1983), it is more common among male than female 
mammals (Greenwood 1980, Clutton-Brock 1989). Hypotheses for causation of age-
and sex-biased dispersal fall into two general models: (1) philopatry by both sexes 
is preferred and subordinants arc forced to leave thei.r natal area or social group 
because of resource competition (Dobson 1982, Moore and Ali 1984, Dobson and 
Jones 1985, Waser 1985, Anderson 1989); (2) juveniles disperse voluntarily 
to search for mates and avoid inbreeding with close relatives (Packer 1979, 
Greenwood 1980, Chesser and Ryman 1986, Harvey and Ralls 1986, Clutton-Brock 
1989). Because the cost of inbreeding in mammals may be higher for females than 
males, females may evolve mechanisms to avoid mating with male relatives 
(Chesser and Ryman 1986). Male-biased dispersal and female philopatry are 
tactics which effectively avoid close inbreeding (Cockburn et al. 1985, Chesser 
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1991a). However, if polygyny persists. only a relatively small fraction of males 
may mate regardless of the cost of dispersal. For mammals such as the black-tailed 
prairie dog (Hoogland 1982) breeding groups comprise a single breeding male and 
5 - 8 breeding females. In such cases, the probability at birth of a male mating 
is approximately lln. Other species exhibit polygamy wherein a male may breed 
with several females, yet over the lifetime of the males the probability of mating 
may be relatively high; thus, the variance in reproductive success of males is low; 
these breeding tactics will result in relatively low coancestry values and probably 
little group integrity. 
Previous inequality models emphasizf;d the constraining costs of dinpersal and 
inbreeding on the inclusive fitness of individuals (Bengtsson 1978, Chesser and 
Ryman 1986). While these papers elucidate the limits to inbreeding and dispersal 
strategies, they require that individuals have some means to accurately assess 
the risks of inbreeding and dispersal as well as the relatedness of group members 
(Chesser and Ryman 1986). The efficacy of such assessment as an evolutionary 
tactic is complicated by the fact that the relatedness within groups may be 
constantly changing. Concomitant evolution of particular breeding and dispersal 
tactics may make assessment ofvicissitudinal conditions unnecessary because the 
results are based on expectations of parameters that remain relatively constant. 
Therefore, these behaviors become fixed tactics rather than varying strategics. 
Breeding behaviors may have evolved to take advantage of particular dispersal 
tactics (or vice versa). Polygyny will contribute little to group integrity for adults 
unless it is accompanied by male-biased dispersal. Likewise, female pbilopatry 
and male dispersal result in minimal values of group coancestry when monogamy 
prevails. In all of the models presented it is assumed that all females breed. 
Females may be readily accepted as mates whereas the competition among males 
may be substantial (Glutton-Brock 1989). 
Membership in social groups may bestow an advantage via predator avoidance, 
rearing of progeny, and cooperative attainment of resources (e.g. prey). Interesting-
ly, our models predict that social groups which are characterized by relatively 
strong gene correlations af(~ likely to exhibit low to moderate group advantage 
(Figs 2 and 3). If the scalar for group advantage is below 2, then only inbreeding 
or groups comprised of full siblings may ensure an individual the same genetic 
contribution to the next generation as that of monogamy. There is little impetus 
for high gene correlations to accrue in situations where the group advantage is 
very high (g >> 5) relative to monogamous systems. Such may be the case in large 
herding mammals and predators which rely on cooperative hunting to capture 
large, mobile prey, especially where the prey may be scarse or difficult to kill (e.g. 
wolf packs in some environments). 
Group advantage is not solely dependent on environmental factors, but may 
also be a function of the gene correlations themselves. Competition among relatives 
is 1 - r (Hamilton l964a, b, Chesser and Ryman 1986); thus, g, the scalar for 
group advantage, may become g = g' + r, where g' is the scalar independent of 
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genetic effects, solely by coancestry within breeding groups. In the instance where 
male polygyny and female philopatry persist, g"" 2.4, and r"" 0.35, leaving about 
2 to 2. 1 for the group advantage independent of gene correlations (g'). Clearly, 
even for the most robust social organizations the advantages for group membership 
must exceed those due to inclusive fitness. 
The asymptotic nature of relationship and coancestry within socially structured 
populations (Chesser 1991a, b) clearly indicates that genetic variance within groups 
accrues at the expense of genetic variance among groups. The partitioning of genetic 
variance likewise infers that the decrease in competition within groups may be 
accompanied by a concomitant increase in competition among groups. Competition 
is produced by a limited supply or availibility of resources and a primary objective 
of social groups may be to partition and protect limiting resources, ultimately to 
increase supply within at the expense of the among groups. Partitioning of any 
resource (genetic, sustenance, nesting sites, etc.) infers variance of the resource 
either over space or time. The logical senquence leads us to the conclusion that 
maintenance ofrobust social organizations whose primary purpose is the attainment 
of resources are dependent more upon the variance of resource distributions than 
upon the mean value of the resources. It follows from our models that if the resource 
variance is high relative to the mean, then group advantage may also be high, and 
groups may be characterized by relatively low genetic relationship. Intermediate 
values ofresource variance may facilitate high gene correlations within groups and 
no variation may invoke little or no group advantage or coancestry within. 
Obviously, there are numerous causes for the persistence of social groups. We 
have focused on but a few and our account of the possible factors is in no way 
complete. The solutions to the models herein do, however, present valuable insight 
into boundary conditions that would lead to a variety of social systems and prediction 
for the genetic characterization of social groups. The evolutionary consequences of 
social organization must follmv from the fitnesses of individuals. We have shown 
that there exists a functional equivalence of individual contributions in socially 
organized systems wherein breeding success is highly variable relative to that of 
homogeneous monogamous systems. Furthermore, this functional equivalance may 
be attained by relatively invariant breeding and dispersal tactics. 
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